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Abstract
This paper studies strategic disclosure by multiple senders competing for prizes awarded
by a single receiver. They decide whether to disclose a piece of information that is both
verifiable and equivocal (it can influence the receiver both ways). The standard unrav-
eling argument breaks down: if the commonly known probability that her information
is favorable is high, a single sender never discloses. Competition restores full disclosure
only if some of the senders are sufficiently unlikely to have favorable information. When
the senders are uncertain about each other’s strength, however, all symmetric equilibria
approach full disclosure as competition increases.
Keywords: Strategic Information Transmission, Persuasion Games, Communication, Com-
petition, Multiple Senders.
JEL classification: C72, D82, D83, L15, M37.
1 Introduction
Competition is generally believed to favor information revelation. In the standard persuasion
game framework where an informed sender tries to persuade an uninformed receiver to take a
certain action by selectively communicating verifiable information, however, it plays no role.
Even with a single sender, all the information is revealed because the receiver understands the
motives behind any action of the sender. For this argument to work, the sender must know how
her information would influence the receiver’s choice. In many instances, however, an agent
controls the access of others to a piece of information but is unable to predict their reactions
∗This research grew out of my Ph.D. dissertation at Stanford University. I am indebted to Paul Milgrom,
Doug Bernheim and Matt Jackson for their guidance. I thank Romans Pancs, Ilya Segal, and Andy Skrzypacz
for useful comments, as well as the members of Paul Milgrom’s reading group.
†Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique, 91128 Palaiseau Cedex, France, E-mail: ed-
uardo.perez@polytechnique.edu.
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to it. When information is equivocal in such a way, the classical unravelling argument breaks
down and competition may play a role.
There are many situations where information may be equivocal. For example, a climate
expert may understand the environmental effects of a particular emission reduction policy, but
be unable to assess its electoral value to those in charge of approving it. A movie producer,
or an online advertiser, may find it impossible to predict how the information conveyed in
a trailer or an ad will affect the willingness to purchase of any particular consumer1. Then
the sender has no incentive to inform an uninformed receiver who is sufficiently inclined to
act as she wishes. A job candidate with a good resume, for example, is unlikely to reveal
additional information about herself in a statement of purpose. Indeed, since it is both difficult
to appreciate how such information will be interpreted by the employer and easy to make
the statement of purpose deliberately vague, a candidate who thinks that she will be hired
on the basis of her resume alone will not communicate potentially detrimental information.
Furthermore, common knowledge that information is equivocal to the candidate prevents the
employer from drawing any unfavorable conclusion from her behavior. A candidate with a
weaker resume, however, may have to provide as much additional information as possible in
order to sway the employer’s decision. Similarly, the best strategy to advertise a movie from a
popular director is to keep the trailer elliptic and mysterious, while the trailer of a movie from
an unknown director will feature all its best scenes in order to attract audiences.
If there are multiple job candidates, a weak one who has to provide more information about
herself in order to stay in the race, may get ahead of an ex ante stronger candidate if her
information turns out to be favorable. This should incentivize strong candidates to disclose
more information as well. Thus, the forces of competition may be expected to lead to more
disclosure. This paper shows that competition is not sufficient for full disclosure in general, and
that weak candidates play an important role.
In the model, several candidates with heterogeneous prospects compete for a limited number
1That is true even if she knows the average consumer’s reaction.
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of homogeneous prizes or slots which can be interpreted as positions, grants, the decision to
implement a project or a policy or the decision to purchase an item. The model incorporates the
search strategy of the receiver who decides how to allocate the slots. A candidate’s prospect is
her probability of being a good fit. I analyze the case in which the prospects of all candidates are
common knowledge among them, as well as the case in which candidates ignore the prospects
of their competitors.
An important assumption is that each piece of information is costly to process for the
receiver. The decision maker has received documentation about some of the projects and
can decide whether to process it. If the processing cost is sufficiently low, I show that it is
an optimal policy for the decision maker to first learn sequentially about all the documented
projects, and allocate a slot to each project that is found to be good. In this processing phase,
she examines the projects in the order of decreasing prospects as long as there are slots to
allocate. She starts allocating slots to undocumented projects only after having examined all
the documented projects, even those less promising than the non-documented ones. Hence, by
withholding information, a candidate loses her priority in the decision process of the decision
maker. It might, however, still be beneficial to do so in equilibrium if the probability that there
are sufficiently many good projects in the set of documented projects is low. For the decision
maker, it is clearly optimal that all information be made available to her since it expands her
choice set.
The first important finding is that sufficient competition leads to full disclosure only if some
of the candidates are weak 2, that is their prospects are sufficiently low that approving them
without further investigation would be wasteful in expectation. This result holds both under
symmetric and asymmetric information. It emphasizes the importance of weak candidates in
this type of contests. Additional results show how the presence of weak candidates improves
information disclosure. The second important finding limits the scope of the first one since,
when candidates do not know about the strength of their competitors, all symmetric equilibria
2In the case of asymmetric information, if the type distribution puts a positive weight on weak types.
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approach full disclosure asymptotically as the number of candidates increases. Hence, in this
case, the role of weak candidates is muted and competition may suffice.
These findings may have policy implications for the preselection of pools of candidates in
procurement contests or when hiring. They can also be applied to the disclosure of information
to buyers in a market. A market where all competitors are strong may harm the consumer by
limiting disclosure. For instance, a horizontal merger between two weak competitors is often
considered to be pro-competitive if it creates a stronger player able to compete more aggressively
with other strong players. The model suggests that such a merger may harm the consumer by
reducing her information. The model is too limited to be used as a policy guide for mergers,
but the consequences of horizontal mergers on information provision may be worth considering.
Yet this aspect of mergers is not mentioned in the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines3.
Related Literature. There is a large literature on strategic communication that distinguishes
soft information (Crawford and Sobel, 1982), from hard information (Grossman, 1981; Gross-
man and Hart, 1980; Milgrom, 1981). The literature on persuasion games4 studies the case
of hard (certifiable) information in problems with a single sender trying to persuade a single
receiver to take a certain action. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and subsequent contributions
identified conditions under which the unraveling argument holds. The receiver must be capable
of strategic reasoning, informed about the interests of the sender and aware of the type of infor-
mation that is available to her. Shin (2003) shows that it may fail if there is uncertainty about
the precision of the sender’s information and Wolinsky (2003) introduces a particular form of
uncertainty about the preferences of the sender. In Dziuda (2011), the unraveling argument fails
because of the structure of provability: every argument disclosed is verifiable, but the receiver
cannot know whether every argument has been disclosed. Another reason that unraveling may
fail is if the direction in which the sender tries to influence the receiver is non-monotonic with
3This document, jointly issued by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice, is available
at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm.
4For a review of this literature see Milgrom (2008); recent contributions also include Glazer and Rubinstein
(2001, 2004). Sobel (2007) summarizes the literature on information transmission. Kartik (2009) builds a bridge
between the hard and soft information approaches.
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respect to the sender’s type (see Giovannoni and Seidmann, 2007; Mathis, 2008; Seidmann and
Winter, 1997)
I also focus on hard information. The single sender/single receiver case of this paper, which
was first analyzed by Caillaud and Tirole (2007), points at another important assumption: the
sender must be able to anticipate the impact of the information she owns on the receiver. Inter-
estingly, the inability of the sender to interpret her information is an advantage. By effectively
eliminating the asymmetry of information, it renders the actions of the sender uninterpretable
by the receiver and allows the sender to fully benefit from the control she exerts over the
availability of information.
Caillaud and Tirole (2007) extend their analysis to a multiple-receivers framework and use
a mechanism design perspective to understand optimal persuasion strategies when decisions
affecting the sender are made by a committee under a qualified majority rule. I analyze a
multiple-senders/single-receiver version of the same benchmark model to explore the effects
of competition. There are few studies of the effects of competition in the literature on hard
information. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Milgrom (2008) show that, even when the
conditions for the unraveling argument fail, competition among senders can sometimes lead to
efficient disclosure.
The paper is also related to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). They model an information
transmission game in which the sender has to commit to a signaling technology before knowing
her type, which has the same implications as the equivocal information assumption. As in
this paper, the game is effectively a symmetric information game. They make no restrictions
on the signaling technology that can be chosen by the sender. By contrast, the model in
this paper and Caillaud and Tirole (2007) restrains the alternatives to perfect signaling or no
signaling. The same authors consider the effects of competition for their model in Gentzkow
and Kamenica (2011). Their framework is broader in a way but does not encompass the model
in this paper. A first difference is the restriction on signaling technologies, a second difference
is that information is costless to process in their model. The results are very different since,
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with two players or more, full revelation is always an equilibrium outcome in their model.
Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2011) also consider competition in a situation where information
is unequivocal and the senders can conceal information by pretending to be uninformed. Finally,
in their conclusion, Che, Dessein and Kartik (2010) suggest that competition may even harm
the receiver in an extension of their framework.
The assumption that an economic agent can control access to information that she cannot
process plays an important role in Eso and Szentes (2003). They propose an agency model
where the principal can release, but not observe, information that would allow the agent to
refine her knowledge of her own type. They show that when the full mechanism design problem
is considered altogether, the optimal mechanism calls for full disclosure and allows the principal
to appropriate the rents of the information she controls exactly as if it were observable to her.
Eso and Szentes (2007) develop an auction model with similar conclusions.
This paper is also connected to the literature on obfuscation which studies the incentive for
firms to manipulate the search cost of consumers. Ellison and Ellison (2009) provide evidence
of such practices. Carlin (2009); Ellison and Wolitzky (2008); Wilson (2010) develop static
models of obfuscation and Carlin and Manso (2010) provide a dynamic model. In the literature
on marketing and advertising, Bar-Isaac, Caruana and Cun˜at (2010) study the incentive of a
monopoly to manipulate the cost of consumers to learn their true valuation. In a similar spirit,
Lewis and Sappington (1994) and Johnson and Myatt (2006) study the optimal information
structure of the consumer about her valuation from the point of view of a monopolist.
Finally, the advertising literature makes predictions about the relationship between product
quality and the informativeness of advertising. This question is connected to the analysis of the
relationship between product quality and levels of advertising in the literature. As summarized
in Bagwell (2007), the empirical literature does not strongly support a systematic positive
relationship. Bagwell and Overgaard (2006) and Bar-Isaac, Caruana and Cun˜at (2010) offer
possible theoretical explanations for a negative relationship. To the extent that the quantity
of advertising and informativeness are related, the benchmark model of Caillaud and Tirole
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(2007) and of this paper offers an alternative simple theoretical explanation in the case of a
monopolist.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
For clarity, the model is described in the language of project adoption, although it fits other
situations as well. Finitely many candidates with a single project each are indexed by the set
N = {1, . . . , N}. They seek to maximize the probability that their project be adopted by a
decision maker who can implement only M ≤ N of them. A project is either good or bad for
the decision maker. A good project yields an expected gain G > 0, whereas a bad project yields
an expected loss L > 05.
All the players share the belief that the projects are independent from one another, and
assign probability ρn ∈ (0, 1) to the event that project n is good. With minimal loss of
generality6, ρ1 > · · · > ρN . Each candidate n controls information that would allow the decision
maker to figure out the value of project n but is irrelevant to other projects. The candidates,
however, are unable to process this information and can only decide whether to communicate
it to the decision maker. Alternatively, I could assume that the candidates must commit to
a communication decision before observing the value of their project. The communication
decisions are taken simultaneously. The decision maker can then choose whether to investigate
each documented project at a cost c > 0, and decide which projects to approve. To denote this
action, I use the term investigate and conditionally approve, where conditionally means that
after being investigated a project is approved if it turns out to be good and if there are slots
available. Her decisions are not contractible and she cannot commit to a policy at the outset.
5In the multi-seller/buyer interpretation of the model, projects are items for sale to a seller with demand for
a fixed quantity M . Then these payoffs implicitly assume away any price heterogeneity across sellers.
6There is a small loss of generality since ties are ruled out, but this is a measure 0 event if the probability
profile is drawn from an atomless joint distribution on [0, 1]N . However, some results are sensitive to this
assumption as indicated below.
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2.2 Assumptions and Notations
Assumptions. Approving a project with prospect ρ without inquiring provides the decision
maker with an expected incremental payoff ρ(G+L)−L, whereas investigating and conditionally
approving the project gives the expected incremental payoff ρG−c. Let ρ ≡ c/G, ρˆ ≡ L/(L+G)
and ρ ≡ 1− c/L.
Assumption 1 (Affordable Learning). The processing cost is sufficiently low to ensure that
investigating is profitable in some cases: c < LG/(L+G). (AL)
(AL) ensures that ρ < ρˆ < ρ. The interval (0,1) can then be partitioned into four intervals
(see Figure 1) such that:
(i) if ρ ∈ (0, ρ), the project is not worth considering for either immediate (i.e. rubberstamp-
ing) or conditional approval (i.e. after investigation);
(ii) if ρ ∈ (ρ, ρˆ), the project is worth investigating, but rubberstamping is wasteful;
(iii) if ρ ∈ (ρˆ, ρ), the first-best option is to investigate, but rubberstamping beats mere rejec-
tion;
(iv) if ρ > ρ, rubberstamping is the first-best option, investigating is wasteful.
Hence (AL) simply says that at least some projects are worth investigating.
Notations. For any subset J ⊆ N , denote its cardinality by J , and let j(1) < · · · < j(J) be
the ordered elements of this subset, so that ρj(1) > · · · > ρj(J).
Definition 1 (Truncated Subsets). For any subset J = {j(1), . . . , j(J)} ⊆ N and any k < J ,
let J −(k) ≡ {j(1), . . . , j(k)} and J +(k) ≡ {j(k+ 1), . . . , j(J)} be the left and right truncations
of J at k. Also for 1 ≤ k < k + r ≤ J , write J (k, k + r) = {j(k + 1), . . . , j(k + r)}. By
convention, J −(0) = J +(J) = ∅.
For a project n ∈ N , and a subset of projects J ⊆ N , let rJ (n) be the rank of n in J .
This does not require n to be an element of J : if n /∈ J then rJ (n) is the rank that n would
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Figure 1: The Decision Maker’s Payoffs with One Candidate
have in J ∪{n}. For example, if N consists of three projects 1, 2 and 3 such that ρ1 > ρ2 > ρ3
and J = {1, 3}, then rJ (3) = rJ (2) = 2 as project 3 is the second strongest project in J and
project 2 would be the second strongest project in J ∪ {2}.
For comparisons between sets of projects, I use the usual set containment order ⊂, and
the strength order which compares the projects of two sets of the same cardinality one by one
according to their rank.
Definition 2 (Strength Order on Sets). For two sets of projects K,K′ ⊆ N with the same
cardinality K = K ′, K is stronger than K′, denoted K > K′ if for every κ = 1, . . . , K, ρk(κ) ≥
ρk′(κ), with at least one of these inequalities holding strictly.
3 The Decision Maker’s Choice7
3.1 More Assumptions
First note that projects with ρ < ρ will always be rejected without investigation since the
expected incremental payoff of investigating ρG − c and the expected incremental payoff of
7See Appendix A for proofs that are not in the text.
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rubberstamping ρ(G+L)−L are both negative. The presence of these projects is also irrelevant
to the disclosure game, since they have no effects on the payoffs of other candidates. IIt
is therefore without loss of generality that I assume that there are no such projects in the
remainder of the paper. I also assume, although not without loss of generality, that no candidate
is sufficiently strong to make the incremental payoff of investigating smaller than the incremental
payoff of rubberstamping,
Assumption 2 (No Extremes). For every n ∈ N , ρ < ρn < ρ. (NE)
Let NW ≡
{
n ∈ N ; ρ < ρn < ρˆ
}
be the set of weak candidates or weak set, and NS ≡
{
n ∈
N ; ρˆ < ρn < ρ
}
be the set of strong candidates or strong set. Weak candidates are those for
which the incremental payoff of investigation is positive while the payoff from rubberstamping
is negative. Strong candidates are those for which this inequality is reversed. In the remainder
of the paper, I also make the following assumption.
Assumption 3 (Learning Priority). Whenever N ≥ 2, ρN(1− ρ1) > c/(L+G). (LP)
This assumption is satisfied if NS = ∅ or if NW = ∅, but it is not satisfied in general. If, for
example, ρ1 ' ρ = 1− c/L and ρN ' ρ = c/G, then ρN(1− ρ1) ' c2/(LG) < c/(L+G), where
the last inequality is a consequence of (AL). (LP) is always satisfied when learning is costless
for the decision maker (c = 0). It can be interpreted as a bound on the processing cost, or as
ruling out excessive heterogeneity in prospects.
I call it the learning priority assumption because it implies that a decision maker with one
slot to fill and a pool of projects reduced to the best and the worst projects from the original
pool would always choose to process all available information before rubberstamping a project.
Indeed, suppose the decision maker has received documentation about N only, and is therefore
contemplating two choices: (i) rubberstamping 1 directly obtaining the payoff ρ1(G + L)− L,
or (ii) first investigating N and then rubberstamping 1 if she finds that N is a bad project,
yielding ρNG + (1 − ρN)(ρ1(G + L) − L) − c. The latter dominates the former if and only if
(LP) is satisfied. Proposition 1 shows that this assumption implies that the decision maker
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prioritizes learning in any situation. It also ensures that any optimal policy of the decision
maker gives the same incentives to candidates in the disclosure game which is important for
the analysis.
3.2 The Search Problem of the Decision Maker
The relevant variable to a decision maker with M slots to fill and a pool of candidates N is the
subset of projects that she can investigate. Let D ⊂ N denote this subset, and H = N rD. D
is the documented set of the decision maker, while H is her hidden set. The partition [D,H] of
the set of projects N is her learning partition. The set of expected payoffs that she can reach
given any policy is then completely characterized by the triple (D,H,M). Let HW ≡ H∩NW ,
HS ≡ H ∩NS, DW ≡ D ∩NW and DS ≡ D ∩NS denote the weak and strong subsets of these
sets.
The policies available to the decision maker can be described as finite sequences of investi-
gation and approval decisions with bounded lengths. Hence the decision maker’s problem is to
maximize a function over a finite set which implies the existence of an optimal policy. Because
(NE) excludes projects for which it is not optimal to investigate on an individual basis, any
policy is equivalent to a sequential policy where, at each stage, the decision maker can either
rubberstamp a project from H or investigate and conditionally approve a project from D8. A
policy in state (D,H,M) is therefore well described by a vector pi = (pi`)1≤`≤` of dimension
` ≤ N , listing elements of N in the order of their examination, with the understanding that if
pi` ∈ D, the policy means investigating pi` at cost c, conditionally approving it, and then moving
on to pi`+1 if some slots remain available, while if pi` ∈ H, the policy means rubberstamping pi`
and then moving on to step pi`+1 if some slots remain available.
Let Π(D,H,M) denote the set of optimal policies at (D,H,M) and let V (D,H,M) be the
maximum achievable payoff. It is intuitive that, at each stage, the decision maker is best off by
8In principle, the decision maker could delay approval after observing that a project is good, but there is no
advantage in doing so since all good projects yield the same expected payoffs.
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choosing between the strongest project in H and the strongest project in D. Hence in each state
(D,H,M), the choice of the decision maker can be described as a choice between (i) approving
h(1) and moving on to the state (D,H+(1),M − 1); or (ii) investigating d(1), approving it if
it is good and moving on to the state (D+(1),H,M − 1), or simply moving on to the state
(D+(1),H,M) if d(1) is bad. Of course there is also the option to rubberstamp a project in D,
but investigating is always better because of (NE). The following lemma identifies some useful
properties that optimal policies must satisfy.
Lemma 1.
(i) Projects in HW are optimally discarded and only the first M projects in HS are ever
considered: Π(D,H,M) = Π(D,H−S (M),M).
(ii) If M > D it is optimal to rubberstamp the first K = min(M − D,HS) projects in HS.
More precisely, any policy in Π(D,H,M) is a policy resulting from the combination of a
policy pi ∈ Π(D,H+S (K),max(D,M − HS)) with the rubberstamping of every project in
H−S (K) in any order and at any point in the sequence.
(iii) If M > HS, there is an optimal policy that consists in filling as many of the first M −HS
slots as possible with projects in D that are found to be good after processing, and then
solving for the continuation problem.
The next result shows that an optimal policy for the decision maker is to start by inves-
tigating all the documented projects in the order of decreasing strength, and then to fill the
remaining slots with the most promising strong undocumented projects while discarding weak
undocumented ones. Hence, withholding information implies losing one’s ex ante priority in
the order of attribution, generating a cost to non-disclosure.
Proposition 1 (Optimal Policy). Given any triple (D,H,M), the following two-step procedure
is an optimal policy for the decision maker. Furthermore, the probability that a certain project
is approved is invariant across all optimal policies of the decision maker.
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Step 1. Investigate and conditionally approve all projects in D sequentially in the order d(1)→
d(2)→ . . . as long as there are some empty slots.
Step 2. Fill the m ≥ 0 remaining slots with the min {m,HS} strongest projects in HS.
The proof consists in a double induction on M and N that extends (LP) to more than
two candidates and one slot. Induction works because of the recursive nature of the decision
maker’s problem, as is usual in search models.
As c approaches 0, any pool of projects satisfies the assumptions of the model ensuring that
the policy is an optimal one. When it is costless to process information, it is natural for the
decision maker to prioritize learning. The proposition says that this priority is maintained for
sufficiently small processing costs where small is defined by (LP) and (AL). When c = 0, the
order of investigation is irrelevant. Therefore, while the policy of the proposition is still an
optimal one, it is no longer true that the probability that a given project is implemented is
invariant across all optimal policies. For instance, another optimal policy would be to process
all documented projects and then to implement as many of the good ones as possible, using
a randomization device if their number is greater than the number of slots. Hence different
optimal policies would give different incentives to the candidates for the disclosure game when
c = 0. Therefore, taking the limit as c goes to 0 of the equilibria analyzed in this paper provides
a method for selecting equilibria in the game with c = 0.
As a consequence of the proposition, the probability that a project is approved depends on
the probabilities of finding good projects in subsets of D. Hence it is useful to introduce the
following notations. For a subset K of D, let f(p,K) denote the probability of finding exactly
p good projects in K, and let
F (p,K) ≡
p∑
q=0
f(q,K)
be the probability that there are fewer than p good projects in K.
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f(p,K) =
∑
J⊂K
J=p
∏
j∈J
∏
l∈KrJ
ρj(1− ρl), (1)
and
F (p,K) =
∑
J⊂K
J≤p
∏
j∈J
∏
l∈KrJ
ρj(1− ρl). (2)
F (p,K) is clearly increasing in p. It is also decreasing in K for the set containment order
and decreasing in ρk for any k ∈ K, as (13) shows. It is therefore decreasing in K for the
strength order. Intuitively, adding new candidates to a pool or increasing the probability that
any project already in the pool is good increases the probability that at least p projects in the
pool are good. These observations derive directly from Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 that can be
found in Appendix A.
With these notations, the probability that d(k), the k-th best project in D, is implemented
by the decision maker is
F (M − 1,D−(k − 1))ρi(k),
and the probability that h(k), the k-th project in H, is implemented is
F (M − k,D) · 1h(k)∈HS .
3.3 Implied Preferences of the Decision Maker
Proposition 1 implies the following expression for the expected payoff of the decision maker
V (D,H,M), where M ′ = min(M,HS)
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V (D,H,M) = (1− F (M − 1,D))MG+G
M−1∑
p=1
pf(p,D)
−c
D−1∑
q=0
F (M − 1,D−(q)) +
M ′∑
r=1
F (M − r,D) (ρh(r)(G+ L)− L) . (3)
The first term measures the payoff from implementing M good projects, weighted by the
probability 1 − F (M − 1,D) of finding them. The second term measures the expected payoff
obtained when less than M − 1 good projects are found in D. The third term measures the
expected cost of the search in D. If less than M − 1 projects are found among the first q < D
projects in D, at least one more project has to be investigated at the cost of c. Finally,
the last term measures the payoff from filling the remaining slots with projects in HS. This
expression uncovers some properties of the decision maker’s preferences over outcomes of the
communication game.
Proposition 2 (Preferences of the Decision Maker).
(i) The decision maker prefers a larger documented set: D0 ⊆ D1 ⇒ V (D1,H1,M) ≥
V (D0,H0,M).
(ii) When M = 1, a decision maker who can choose from which candidate to get information
between a stronger and a weaker one always opts for the stronger one.
Clearly, a larger documented set gives more options to the decision maker who can then
choose whether to investigate. With a single slot, it is also true that the decision maker prefers
to get information from stronger candidates. It is perhaps more surprising that this result does
not hold in general for M > 1, as the following example shows.
Example 1. Consider the case of three strong candidates for two slots. If the two most promising
candidates disclose their information while the third one does not, the payoff of the decision
maker is V1 = 2ρ1ρ2G + G(ρ1(1 − ρ2) + ρ2(1 − ρ1)) − 2c + (1 − ρ1ρ2)(ρ3(G + L) − L). The
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first term gives her payoff if the search in her documented set is fully successful weighted by
the probability of such a success; the second term is the weighted payoff of the search when
it is only partially successful, the third term is the cost of the search; the last term is the
weighted payoff from rubberstamping the third project when the search is not fully successful.
If the first and the third candidate disclose their information while the second does not her
payoff is V2 = 2ρ1ρ3G + G(ρ1(1 − ρ3) + ρ3(1 − ρ1)) − 2c + (1 − ρ1ρ3)(ρ2(G + L) − L). Then
V2 − V1 = (1 − ρ1)(ρ2 − ρ3)L > 0. Hence the decision maker prefers to get information from
candidate 3 than from candidate 2 when candidate 1 is disclosing. In fact, it is easy to show
that with 3 strong candidates and two slots, the decision maker always prefers to obtain her
information from weaker candidates.
4 The Disclosure game9
4.1 Benchmark: One Candidate
This case is also the benchmark case of Caillaud and Tirole (2007) who first analyzed it. The
only problem for the decision maker is to know whether the single project is worth implementing.
Let ρ be its prospect. If ρ > ρˆ the decision maker accepts the project based on her prior. She
would, however, be willing to investigate the project whenever ρG − c > ρG − (1 − ρ)L, or
equivalently ρ < ρ. If on the other hand ρ < ρˆ, the decision maker is willing to investigate if
ρG− c > 0 that is ρ > ρ.
Proposition 3 (Caillaud and Tirole 2007). If ρ < ρ, the project is discarded without exam-
ination. If it is in the weak set (ρ < ρ < ρˆ), it is investigated and conditionally approved,
while if ρ > ρˆ it is rubberstamped by the decision maker. If the project is in the strong set
(ρˆ < ρ < ρ), the decision maker prefers to investigate, but the candidate is not willing to
9Proofs that are not in the text can be found in Appendix B
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Figure 2: Payoff of the Decision Maker with One Candidate.
disclose her information. The expected payoff of the decision maker in equilibrium is given by
(
ρG− c
)
1ρ∈NW +
(
ρ(L+G)− L
)
1ρ∈NS .
The result of Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 2. When ρ is in the strong set, the
candidate has real authority over the final decision in the sense of Aghion and Tirole (1997)
since she effectively controls the decision. This generates a non-monotonicity in the expected
payoff of the decision maker as a function of ρ.
4.2 Multiple Candidates
An action profile is equivalent to a partition [D,H] of N . Given a project n ∈ N , denote by
[D,H]−n an action profile of all the candidates except n. It is a partition of N r {n}. Since,
by Lemma 1, any project in HW is discarded by the decision maker, a candidate n ∈ NW
is certain that her project stands no chance if she refuses to disclose her information. If,
on the other hand, she disclosed this information, she would face the probability of adoption
F
(
M − 1,D−(rD(n)− 1))ρn > 0. This leads to the following remark.
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Remark 1. It is a dominant strategy for candidates in NW to disclose their information.
Therefore, in any equilibrium H = HS, and NW ⊆ D. Note that disclosing always yields a
positive probability of approval. Withholding, on the other hand, yields a null probability of
approval for all but the first M projects in HS. Consequently, in any equilibrium, H ≤M , for
otherwise candidate h(M + 1) would gain by disclosing.
Remark 2. Any equilibrium action profile [D,H] satisfies H ≤M .
For the same reason, when H = M , no candidate weaker than h(M) has any incentive to
withhold.
Remark 3. Given any action profile [D,H] such that H = M , a candidate n ∈ D such that
rN (n) > rN (h(M)) has no incentive to deviate.
By definition, an equilibrium must satisfy as many incentive constraints as there are can-
didates. Fortunately, many of these constraints do not bind. To see this I introduce a new
definition. A subset of projects M ⊆ N is a chain if it consists of consecutive elements of N ,
that is M = {n, n + 1, . . . , n + k} ⊆ N . A chain M ⊆ L ⊆ N is said to be maximal in L if
any other chain M′ ⊆ L satisfies M′ ⊆M or M∩M′ = ∅.
The next result states that along any chain of strong disclosing candidates, the incentive to
deviate is higher for weaker projects. This useful result works for a single slot or if the prospect
of the strongest project is less than 1/2.
Lemma 2. Suppose M = 1 or ρ1 ≤ 1/2. Pick an action profile [D,H], and a chain J ⊆ DS.
Then for any p < J , candidate j(p + 1) has a higher incentive to deviate from disclosure than
j(p).
These observations lead to a considerable reduction of the incentive constraints that need
to be checked to ensure that a pure strategy profile is an equilibrium of the disclosure game.
This is summarized in a characterization of pure strategy equilibria provided in Proposition 15
in Appendix B.
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4.3 Full Disclosure
Since full disclosure is the optimal outcome of the disclosure game for the decision maker, it is
important to characterize the conditions under which it obtains. The first result is that there
must be at least one weak candidate in the pool for full disclosure to be possible.
Proposition 4 (Full Disclosure – Impossibility). Full disclosure is impossible in the absence of
weak candidates.10
Proof. If all projects are strong and all candidates disclose, the weakest candidate has the same
probability of being reached by the search whether she discloses or not. But, conditionally on
being reached, her project is certain to be accepted if she withholds and not otherwise.
When Lemma 2 applies, it is easy to provide a necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of a full disclosure equilibrium. Indeed, the only condition to check is that the weakest
candidate in NS has no incentive to deviate.
Proposition 5 (Full Disclosure – Characterization). If M = 1 of ρ1 ≤ 1/2 , full disclosure is
an equilibrium of the disclosure game if and only if the weakest of the strong candidates has no
incentive to deviate, that is
ρNS ≥
F (M − 1,N r {NS})
F (M − 1,N−(NS − 1)) . (4)
Furthermore, the disclosure game is dominance solvable whenever the inequality in (4) holds
strictly. In particular, full disclosure is then the unique equilibrium.
Proposition 4 and 5 show the importance of weak candidates. It is competition from weak
candidates, who cannot afford secrecy, that puts pressure on stronger candidates to reveal their
information. More generally, the right-hand side of (4) is decreasing in NW both for the set
10If some candidates have the same prospects, however, competition may lead to full disclosure even in the
absence of weak candidates.
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order and for the strength order, implying that a better pool of weak candidates makes condition
(4) easier to satisfy.
For the single-slot case, a sufficient condition for full disclosure can be provided in the form
of a lower bound on the number NW of weak candidates.
Proposition 6. If M = 1, full disclosure is an equilibrium if and only if
ρNS ≥
∏
n∈NW
(1− ρn). (5)
In particular NW ≥ B(ρNS) is a sufficient condition for the existence of a full disclosure equi-
librium, where
B(ρ) ≡ min{k ∈ N : (1− c/G)k < ρ} = ⌈ log ρ
log(1− c/G)
⌉
.
An alternative sufficient condition that does not depend on the prospect of any particular project
is NW > B(ρˆ).
4.4 The Single-Slot Case
When there is a single slot, the pure strategy equilibrium of the game can be fully characterize.
Let n∗ = min{n ∈ NS : ρn ≤ (1− ρn+1) . . . (1− ρN)}, and n∗ = ∅ when the set is empty. n∗ is
the strongest candidate of the strong set whose prospect is less than the probability that none
of the projects with lower prospects is good. It is also the strongest candidate of the strong
set who prefers to withhold when everyone else discloses. If there is no such candidate, full
disclosure is the equilibrium outcome. If n∗ = 1, then candidate 1 is the only one withholding
information in equilibrium. Otherwise, either n∗− 1 has no incentive to withhold given that n∗
does and other candidates disclose, and then either this is an equilibrium or there is no pure
strategy equilibrium.
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Proposition 7 (Single Slot – Equilibrium Characterization). In the case M = 1 there exists an
equilibrium in pure strategies if n∗ ∈ {1,∞} or if n∗ satisfies ρn∗−1 ≥ (1− ρn∗+1) . . . (1− ρN).
When it exists, this equilibrium is unique. It is full disclosure if n∗ = ∅, and otherwise the only
withholding candidate in equilibrium is n∗.
The next proposition shows that improving the set of weak candidates NW can only lead to
a better pure strategy equilibrium of the disclosure game from the point of view of the decision
maker. The reason is that as the set of weak candidates gets better, the single withholding
candidate in equilibrium gets weaker, which is good for the decision maker by Proposition 2.
Proposition 8 (Single Slot – Comparative Statics). Improving the set of weak candidates, either
by adding more weak candidates or by increasing the prospects of the current ones, is welfare
improving for the decision maker.
With a single slot, it is also possible to know when the strongest project would be optimally
rubberstamped by the decision maker as the outcome of the game. It is the case if its strength
is above a lower bound ρ+. Interestingly, it does not depend on the number of candidates, or
the particular profile of prospects, but it is naturally decreasing in c. In this proposition only,
(NE) and (LP) are no longer assumed to hold.
Proposition 9 (Outstanding Candidates). If M = 1, there exists ρ+ > ρ such that for every
profile of prospects, the decision maker optimally rubberstamps project 1 given any documented
set that excludes project 1 whenever ρ1 > ρ
+, where
ρ+ =
1
2
(
1 +
√
1− 4c
L+G
)
.
Hence in any equilibrium project 1 is rubberstamped, and candidate 1 either withholds or is
indifferent between withholding and disclosing.
To conclude this section, I consider the example of two strong candidates, and possibly
many weak candidates. In general, mixed strategy equilibria are difficult to characterize and
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may involve mixing by more than two candidates, but they can be analyzed in a simple way in
this example.
Example 2. When NS = 2, a mixed strategy equilibrium obtains whenever (1− ρ2)f(0,NW ) <
ρ1 < f(0,NW ) (from Proposition 7). In this case, the mixed strategy equilibrium is unique
and the two strong candidates play as follows. The stronger one discloses her information
with probability λ1 =
ρ2
ρ1ρ2+(1−ρ1)f(0,NW ) , while the weaker one discloses her information with
probability λ2 =
f(0,NW )−ρ1
ρ2f(0,NW ) . The argument is in Appendix B).
5 Incomplete Information11
In some applications, it may be unreasonable to assume that candidates know each other’s
prospect, especially when their number is large. Then it is still true that weak types are
needed for full disclosure, and more generally that they favor information revelation. However,
their role is less important since, even in the absence of weak types, competition leads to full
disclosure in the limit.
I assume that the prospects of the projects are drawn independently from an atomless
distribution with cumulative density function H and full support S = [x, x] ⊆ [ρ, ρ] such that
x(1 − x) > c/(L + G)12. The corresponding probability density function h is assumed to be
bounded away from 0 by some m > 013. All prospects are observed by the decision maker
so that the policy of Proposition 1 remains optimal. N is common knowledge. The type of
candidate n is her realized prospect ρn ∈ S. Types lying in S ∩ (0, ρˆ) are weak, and types in
S ∩ (ρˆ, x) are strong. If ρˆ ≤ x, weak types are absent, and otherwise they are present.
A distributional strategy of candidate n is a probability measure λn on S × {0, 1} for
which the marginal distribution of S is h, where {0, 1} is a description of the action set and
1 corresponds to disclosing. This formalism introduced by Milgrom and Weber (1985) allows
11All proofs are in Appendix C.
12Hence any particular realization of the vector of prospects satisfies (LP).
13The only result that relies on this assumption is Proposition 14
22
one to describe mixing behaviors by the players while avoiding the measurability issue noted in
Aumann (1964). The probability that player n discloses information given that her type is ρ
is then λn(1|ρ). To simplify the notations, I denote this probability by λn(ρ). The equilibrium
notion for the disclosure game is Bayesian Nash equilibrium in distributional strategies. In
general, I consider only symmetric equilibria but I show in Proposition 11 that under certain
conditions the game is dominance solvable and then full disclosure is the unique equilibrium.
In this section, full disclosure denotes the strategy profile such that all the candidates disclose
with probability 1 regardless of their type. Finally, if (λ1, . . . , λN) is an equilibrium, then so is
any strategy profile (λ′1, . . . , λ
′
N) such that λ
′
n and λn differ on a subset of measure 0 of the set
on which n is indifferent between disclosing or not. The characterization results in what follows
are up to this known issue. Int(X) and Cl(X) denote the interior and the closure of a set X.
5.1 The Single-Slot Case
Let λ = (λ1, · · · , λN) be a strategy profile. Supposing that all other candidates are playing
according to λ, the payoffs of candidate n are given by
V λD,n(ρ) ≡ ρE
[∏
m 6=n
(1− λm(ρm)ρm1ρm>ρ)
]
= ρ
∏
m 6=n
(
1−
∫ x
ρ
xλm(x)dH(x)
)
, (6)
if she discloses, and
V λH,n(ρ) ≡ E
[∏
m 6=n
λm(ρm) (1− ρm) + (1− λm(ρm))1ρm<ρ
]
1ρ≥ρˆ
= 1ρ≥ρˆ
∏
m6=n
(∫ x
x
λm(x)(1− x)dH(x) +
∫ ρ
x
(1− λm(x)) dH(x)
)
, (7)
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if she withholds14. V λD,n is continuous in type
15 while V λH,n has a single discontinuity at ρˆ if weak
types are present. V λD,n is also strictly increasing in ρ, while V
λ
H,n is only weakly increasing in
ρ. In particular, it is constant on any interval of types on which all other players disclose with
probability 1. The reason is that the probability of being considered by the decision maker
when withholding depends on a candidate’s own type ρ only through the implied probability
that a candidate with type higher than ρ also withholds, which is invariant while ρ stays within
an interval on which other candidates disclose.
If λ = (λ, . . . , λ) is a symmetric strategy profile, dropping the n index for the payoff func-
tions,
V λD(ρ) = ρ
(
1−
∫ x
ρ
xλ(x)dH(x)
)N−1
, (8)
and,
V λH(ρ) =
(∫ x
x
λ(x)(1− x)dH(x) +
∫ ρ
x
(1− λ(x)) dH(x)
)N−1
1ρ≥ρˆ. (9)
A profile λ is an equilibrium if n is willing to play according to λn when other candidates
follow λ. Let Λn ≡ {ρ ∈ S : λn(ρ) ∈ (0, 1)}, Λ0n ≡ {ρ ∈ S : λn(ρ) = 0} and Λ1n ≡ {ρ ∈ S :
λn(ρ) = 1}. Then λ is an equilibrium strategy if and only if
(i) ∀ρ ∈ Λ0n, V λD,n(ρ) ≤ V λH,n(ρ),
(ii) ∀ρ ∈ Λn, V λD,n(ρ) = V λH,n(ρ),
(iii) ∀ρ ∈ Λ1n, V λD,n(ρ) ≥ V λH,n(ρ).
14In both equations, the equality is a consequence of the independence of the prospects.
15The only non-obvious part of the argument consists in showing that
∫ x
ρ
xλm(x)dH(x) is continuous in ρ.
Because λm is bounded between 0 and 1,
∣∣∣∫ xρ xλm(x)dH(x)− ∫ xρ′ xλ(x)dH(x)∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∫ ρ′ρ dH(x)∣∣∣ = |H(ρ)−H(ρ′)|
for any pair (ρ, ρ′). Hence, H being atomless, this difference goes to 0 when ρ′ → ρ, and that concludes the
argument. A similar argument works for V λH .
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Before going further, note that there exists a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in
distributional strategies. This result needs a minor adaptation of Milgrom and Weber (1985)
because of the symmetry requirement and the argument can be found in Appendix C. As I
show below, symmetric pure strategy equilibria, however, do not always exist16.
Proposition 10 (BNE existence). There exists a symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in
distributional strategies for the disclosure game.
As in the case with perfect information, it is clear that any strategy that prescribes to
disclose with probability less than 1 for weak types is strictly dominated.
Lemma 3. Any strategy λn such that λn(ρ) < 1 for some ρ < ρˆ is strictly dominated.
Therefore in equilibrium [x, ρˆ) ⊆ Λ1n. It is easy to prove that when weak types are present,
sufficient competition yields full disclosure.
Proposition 11 (Full Disclosure). If weak types are present, full disclosure is an equilibrium
if and only if
N ≥ Nˆ ≡ 1 + log(1/ρˆ)
log
(
1− ∫ x
ρˆ
xdH(x)
)
− log
(
1− ∫ x
x
xdH(x)
) . (10)
Furthermore the game is dominance solvable whenever this inequality holds strictly. In partic-
ular, full disclosure is then the unique equilibrium. In the absence of weak types, full disclosure
is never an equilibrium.
In order to understand the role of weak and strong candidates, it is interesting to look at
the effect of the distribution of types on Nˆ . The next result shows that increasing the weight
on stronger types in the weak set and decreasing the weight on stronger types in the strong set
while keeping the relative weights of these sets constant, hence concentrating the distribution
around ρˆ, leads to a lower threshold Nˆ . Obviously it is also better to have stronger candidates
16Since payoffs depend on both the types and actions of other candidates, the purification theorem of Milgrom
and Weber (1985) does not apply.
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for the decision maker, therefore decreasing the weight on stronger types in the strong set has an
additional detrimental effect. Increasing the weight on stronger types in the weak set, however,
is unambiguously better for the decision maker.
Proposition 12 (Comparative Statics). Consider two distributions G and H with the same
support S that includes weak types, ρˆ ∈ S, and such that for every x ∈ S, G(x) ≤ H(x) if
x ≤ ρˆ, and G(x) ≥ H(x) if x ≥ ρˆ. Then NˆG ≤ NˆH .
The next lemma shows that if a strong type ρ discloses information with probability 1 in a
symmetric equilibrium, then all the types above ρ also disclose with probability 1. The intuition
is the following. If there exists an interval Ω on which λ is equal to 1, then as already noted
V λH is constant on Ω while V
λ
D is strictly increasing. If λ is an equilibrium strategy, V
λ
D > V
λ
H
on Ω. But then, the continuity of the two payoff functions implies that V λH can never catch up
with V λD as ρ increases, so that disclosing must be strictly better than withholding.
Lemma 4. If λ is a symmetric equilibrium such that there exists a strong type ρ > ρˆ satisfying
ρ ∈ Int(Λ1), then [ρ, x] ⊆ Λ1.
Therefore, in any equilibrium Int(Λ1) = (x, ρˆ) ∪ (ρ∗, x) for some ρ∗ ∈ [ρˆ, x], or Int(Λ1) =
(x, x). In the absence of weak types, Int(Λ1) = (ρ∗, x). The next proposition, which character-
izes the symmetric equilibria in pure strategies, is an immediate corollary of this lemma.
Proposition 13 (Equilibrium Characterization). If λ is a symmetric equilibrium in pure strate-
gies, it must take the form
λ(ρ) = 1ρ∈Λ1 ,
where
Λ1 = [x, ρˆ) ∪ 〈ρ∗, x]
for some ρ∗ ≥ ρˆ, and where 〈 denotes either ( or [.
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When ρ∗ is interior, ρ∗ ∈ (ρˆ, x), it must be a solution to the following equation in ρ
(
1− ρ 1N−1
)(
1−
∫ x
ρ
xdH(x)
)
=
∫ ρˆ
x
xdH(x). (11)
Furthermore, in the absence of weak types, there is no symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies.
Hence, symmetric pure strategy equilibria other than full disclosure, when they exist, must
be non-monotonic in the presence of weak types. The characterization of the threshold ρ∗ in
(11) derives from the fact that a player with type ρ∗ must be indifferent between disclosing and
withholding. It is not difficult to find examples of such equilibria. A simple one is with c = 0,
ρˆ = 0.25, [x, x] = [0, 1], the uniform distribution and less than 3 candidates.
Knowing that sufficient competition leads to full disclosure as long as weak types are present,
one may wonder about the effect of competition in the absence of weak types. The following
proposition shows that, even though full disclosure is never an equilibrium, any sequence of
symmetric equilibria approaches full disclosure as N goes to infinity.
Proposition 14 (Competition at the Limit). In the absence of weak types, there exists some
N˜ such that for all N > N˜ every symmetric equilibrium λ is of the form Cl(Λ) = [x, y] and
Λ1 ⊇ (y, x], with y ∈ (x, x). If {λN}∞N=1 is a sequence of equilibria for N candidates then yN is
defined for N > N˜ and
lim
N→∞
yN = x.
Furthermore for every ε > 0 there exists some N ′ > N˜ such that if N > N ′, then for almost
every ρ ∈ ΛN , ∣∣∣∣λN(ρ)− 11 + ρ
∣∣∣∣ < ε.
These equilibria approach full disclosure in the sense that as N goes to infinity, any type
discloses with a probability arbitrarily close to 1.
Corollary 1. In the absence of weak types, if {λN}∞N=1 is a sequence of symmetric equilibria,
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then for every ρ ∈ (x, x]
lim
N→∞
λN(ρ) = 1.
5.2 Multiple Slots M ≥ 1
The case with multiple slots is far less tractable. However the results of Proposition 13 still
hold with a different characterization of ρ∗, and in particular the impossibility of full disclosure
in the absence of weak types (see Proposition 16 in Appendix C for a proof).
6 Conclusion
Common knowledge that information is unequivocal to its owners is a crucial assumption the
unraveling argument to work in strategic disclosure games. When information is equivocal,
the receiver cannot second-guess the actions of the sender, and skepticism does not ensure full
revelation. Competition can mitigate this problem, but only under certain conditions. The
results of this paper highlight the importance of ex ante weaker candidates to elicit information
transmission in certain types of contests. They are less important when candidates have im-
perfect information about their competitors. Then competition is sufficient for full disclosure,
at least asymptotically.
The equivocal information assumption may deserve further examination. In the context of
this model, the inability of the sender to understand the consequences of her information gives
her an advantage. This may give an incentive to a sender who can interpret information to
pretend she cannot, a question that it may be interesting to explore in a reputation model, for
example, where it could be valuable to establish a reputation of limited understanding.
The model offers several insights into practical situations of advertising in particular. It
would be interesting to analyze this link with advertising further, for example by considering
heterogeneous consumers and including price competition. This is only one way of introduc-
ing heterogeneity on the receiving side. Another interesting extension would be to blend the
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framework of this paper with that of Caillaud and Tirole (2007), with multiple senders and a
committee of receivers with heterogeneous beliefs. Correlations in the preferences of the com-
mittee members give the opportunity for a sender to engineer cascades of information among
members to push her case. These forces seriously complicate the analysis of the competition
among senders.
Appendix A Optimal Policy of the Decision Maker
Proof of Lemma 1. The first part of (i) comes from the fact that projects in HW cannot be
investigated, and the incremental expected payoff of rubberstamping them is negative. The
second part of the statement is obvious given the existence of the cap M on the number of
projects that can be implemented. (ii) is true because any project in HS has a positive expected
incremental payoff, and therefore the first min(M − D,HS) projects in HS should be used to
fill the slots that cannot be filled by projects in D since D < M . Finally (iii) holds because it
never hurts to fill slots that cannot be filled by projects in HS with projects in D.
Proof of Proposition 1 (Optimal Policy). If D = N it is clearly optimal to investigate
projects starting from the strongest one and then moving down in the strength order, approving
a project each time it is found to be good, until all slots are filled. The policy of the proposition
clearly does this. If H = N it is also clear that the policy of the proposition is optimal: since
projects inNS have positive expected incremental payoffs the strongest ones should be approved
according to the availability of slots.
Consider states that satisfy D ≥ M = H and H ⊆ NS. Below, I show, by a double
induction on D and M = H, that the policy described in the proposition is optimal for all
such states, and that it is the unique optimal policy up to some details in the order of learning
explained below. Take this result as given for now. It implies that the policy of the proposition
is optimal, although not uniquely, in any other state. This is a consequence of Lemma 1.
Indeed, by point (i) of the lemma, projects in HW are irrelevant. Hence I can assume that
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M ≤ N −HW = D+HS for additional slots would never be filled. By point (ii), I can assume
D ≥ M for otherwise the optimal policy consists in rubberstamping projects in HS until a
state where D = M is reached and then continuing with the optimal policy. Furthermore,
the lemma says that this rubberstamping can occur at any place in the sequence describing
the optimal policy. Hence it can be done at the end of the sequence so that the policy of the
proposition is indeed optimal. This is the first source of non uniqueness of the optimal policy.
Since the projects rubberstamped in this operation are the strongest in H, and are certain
to get approved, however, they are also irrelevant to the probability that any given project is
approved across different optimal policies. Point (i) and (iii) of the lemma allow me to consider
only the cases where H = M . As a consequence, an optimal policy can always be described
as: always start by learning as much as possible, and then rubberstamp. But since the order of
investigation never affects the probability of having to rubberstamp some projects in the end,
it is always optimal to investigate stronger projects first as it minimizes the cost of the search.
This is not uniquely optimal, however, for the following reason. If there are M slots available
then the order in which the first M projects in D are investigated is irrelevant since at least M
projects will be investigated regardless of what is found. Hence the proof that follows implies
optimality, and uniqueness up to this subtlety. But the argument just made implies that the
probability that a given project is approved is unaltered by which particular optimal policy is
used.
Initiation D = {d}, H = {h}, M = 1. In this case the choice is between (i) rubberstamping
h, and (ii) investigating d, approving d if it is of the good type, rejecting d and rubberstamping
h if it is of the bad type. The first choice pays ρh(G + L) − L while the second one pays
ρdG− c+ (1− ρd)(ρh(G+ L)− L). Letting ∆ be the gain from learning,
∆ = ρd(1− ρh)(G+ L)− c > 0.
where the inequality holds because of (LP). Hence the unique optimal policy is to learn first.
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Induction Step, D > M = H = 1. Suppose the result holds for any triple (D,H,M) such
that D = K > H = M = 1 and H ⊆ NS, and consider a state (D,H,M) with D = K + 1.
The decision maker can either (i) rubberstamp h and end, or (ii) investigatea project d in D,
approve d and end if it is of the good type, and move on to the state (Dr{d}, {h}, 1) otherwise.
Hence we only need to compare the payoff of (ii)
ρdG− c+ (1− ρd)V (D r {d}, {h}, 1),
to the payoff ρh(G+ L)− L of (i). Letting ∆ denote the gain from learning
∆ = ρd(1− ρh)(G+ L)− c+ (1− ρd)V (D r {d}, {h}, 1) > 0,
where the first two terms add up to something positive by (LP), and the last term is non-
negative because the decision maker always has the option to discard all remaining projects
and get 0. Hence, investigating first is optimal, and by the induction hypothesis it is also the
best continuation policy. Because investigating in the order of decreasing strength minimizes
the cost of search, it is optimal to do so. This proves the claim. It is unique up to the subtlety
about the order of learning explained above.
Induction Step, D > M = H > 1. Suppose the result holds for all (D,H,M) with H ⊆ NS
such that H = M ≤ K, or H = M = K + 1 and D ≤ J . Consider a triple (D,H,M)
where H = M = K + 1 and D = J + 1. Consider the choice between (i) investigating (and
conditionally approving) project d(1) in D, and (ii) rubberstamping a project h ∈ H. Then the
decision can move on with an optimal continuation policy. I only consider the investigation of
d(1) since it is clearly the best option among policies that start with investigation. The first
option yields
ρd(1)
(
G+ V (D r {d(1)},Hr {h(H)},M − 1)
)
+ (1− ρd(1))V (D r {d(1)},H,M)− c,
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while the second option yields
ρh(G+ L)− L+ V (D,Hr {h},M − 1),
which by induction can be rewritten as
ρh(G+L)−L+ρd(1)
(
G+V (Dr{d(1),Hr{h, h(H)},M−2)
)
+(1−ρd(1))V (Dr{d(1)},Hr{h},M−1)−c
The gain from learning is then
∆ = ρd(1)
(
V (D r {d(1)},H,M − 1)− (V (D r {d(1)},Hr {h, h(H)},M − 2) + ρh(G+ L)− L))︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+(1− ρd(1))
(
V (D r {d(1)},H,M)− (V (D r {d(1)},Hr {h},M − 1) + ρh(G+ L)− L))︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
.
A > 0. Indeed in state (Dr {d(1)},Hr {h(H)},M − 1) an available policy is to rubberstamp
h and then move on to state (Dr{d(1)},Hr{h, h(H)},M −2) and continue with the optimal
policy. Because of the induction hypothesis, this is not optimal at (Dr{d(1)},Hr{h(H)},M−
1), and A is exactly the difference of payoffs between the former policy and the optimal one.
A similar argument shows that B > 0. Therefore ∆ > 0 implying that learning is optimal at
(D,H,M). Once again this implies that the policy of the proposition is uniquely optimal up
to the order of learning.
Induction Step, D = M = H. Suppose now that the result holds for all (D,H,M) with
H ⊆ NS and H = M ≤ K, and consider a triple (D,H,M) such that D = H = M = K + 1.
Then the payoff of learning about d(1) is
ρd(1)
(
G+V (Dr{d(1)},Hr{h(H)},M−1)
)
+
(
1− ρd(1)
) (
ρh(1)(G+L)−L+V (D+(1),H+(1),M−1)
)
−c,
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and the payoff of rubberstamping h(1) (h(1) is clearly better than any other h here) is
ρh(1)(G+ L)− L+ V (D,Hr {h(1)},M − 1),
or, because of the induction hypothesis,
ρh(1)(G+ L)− L+ ρd(1)
(
G+ V (D r {d(1)},Hr {h(1), h(H)},M − 2)
)
+
(
1− ρd(1)
)
V (D r {d(1)},Hr {h(1)},M − 1)− c.
Hence the gain from learning is
∆ = ρd(1)
(
V (D r {d(1)},Hr {h(H)},M − 1)
−(V (D r {d(1)},Hr {h(1), h(H)},M − 2) + ρh(1)(G+ L)− L)).
By the induction hypothesis, rubberstamping h(1) is an available but non optimal policy at
(D r {d(1)},Hr {h(H)},M − 1), hence ∆ > 0. This concludes the proof.
Lemma 5. For any K ⊆ N , k ∈ K, p ∈ {1, · · · , K} and q ≤ K,
f(p,K) = ρkf(p− 1,K r {k}) + (1− ρk)f(p,K r {k}), (12)
and
F (q,K) = F (q,K r {k})− ρkf(q,K r {k}). (13)
Proof. For p ≥ 1 the probability of finding p good projects in K is equal to the probability of
finding p− 1 good projects in K r {k} times the probability that k is a good project plus the
probability of finding p good projects in K r {k} times the probability that k is not a good
project. This is exactly (12). (13) is obtained by summation of (12) for p ≤ q.
Lemma 6. For fixed p > 0 and J ⊆ N , and any subset of projects K ⊆ N such that J ∩K = ∅
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and 0 < K < p,
F (p,J ∪ K) > F (p−K,J ) (14)
Proof. I show the result for K = 1. The general result follows by iteration. Let k be the unique
project in K. Then, by Lemma 5
F (p,J ∪ {k}) = F (p,J )− ρkf(p,J ).
Therefore
F (p,J ∪ {k})− F (p− 1,J ) = F (p,J )− F (p− 1,J )− ρjf(p,J )
= (1− ρj)f(p,J ) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Preferences of the Decision Maker). Point (i) is clear. For
(ii), consider a swap of the following type. For a fixed set of projects N take two projects n
and m, with n < m (ρn > ρm). Let [Dˆ, Hˆ] be a partition of N r {n,m}. Let D0 = Dˆ ∪ {m},
H0 = Hˆ ∪ {n}, D1 = Dˆ ∪ {n} and H1 = Hˆ ∪ {m}. Then [D0,H0] and [D1,H1] are both
partitions of N that are obtained from one another by swapping the roles of n and m, so that
D1 > D0 and H1 < H0. The decision maker of the proposition is asked to choose between
(D1,H1) and (D0,H0), and the proposition says that it is optimal to choose (D1,H1), that is
V (D1,H1, 1) ≥ V (D0,H0, 1).
I prove the proposition for the case where the two swapped projects are adjacent in N , that
is m = n + 1. Evidently this proves the general result, as any other swap can be decomposed
in a series of swaps between adjacent projects. When M = 1 and the learning partition of the
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decision maker is given by [D,H], the expected payoff of the decision maker is
V (D,H, 1) = (1− f(0,D))G+ f(0,D)
(
ρh(1)(G+ L)− L
)
− c
D−1∑
q=0
F (0,D−(q)).
Let ∆ be the change in payoff due to the swap ∆ = V (D1,H1, 1)−V (D0,H0, 1). Using Lemma 5,
and supposing rH(n) > 1 or n /∈ NS, it is equal to
∆ = (ρn − ρn+1)f(0, Dˆ)(1− ρh(1))(G+ L) + c
D∑
q=Q
(
F (0,D−0 (q))− F (0,D−1 (q))
)
,
where Q = rD(n). The first term is clearly positive, and the second term, that corresponds
to the decrease of the search cost when the set of searchable projects is improved, is positive
because for any q = Q, . . . , D, it is true that D−0 (q) < D−1 (q) and F (., .) is decreasing in its
second argument for the strength order.
If {n, n+ 1} ⊆ NS and rH(n) = rH(n+ 1) = 1, then
∆ = (ρn − ρn+1)f(0, Dˆ)G− (ρn − ρn+1)f(0, Dˆ)(G+ L) + Lf(0, Dˆ)(ρn − ρn+1)
+ c
D∑
q=Q
(
F (0,D−0 (q))− F (0,D−1 (q))
)
,
and the first three terms sum up to 0 so that ∆ > 0.
Finally, if n ∈ NS, n+ 1 /∈ NS and rH(n) = 1, then
∆ = (ρn−ρn+1)f(0, Dˆ)G−f(0, Dˆ)(1−ρn+1)
(
ρn(G+L)−L
)
+c
D∑
q=Q
(
F (0,D−0 (q))−F (0,D−1 (q))
)
,
so that
∆ = f(0, Dˆ)ρn+1(1− ρn)(G+ L) + c
D∑
q=Q
(
F (0,D−0 (q))− F (0,D−1 (q))
)
> 0.
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Appendix B The disclosure game
The incentive of a candidate n to deviate from an action profile [D,H] is defined as the ratio
of her deviation payoff over her current payoff, and it is denoted by δ(n, [D,H]) or simply δ(n)
when the context is clear.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let n and n + 1 be two adjacent projects in N in J , let r = rH(n) =
rH(n+ 1) be the rank that any of these projects would occupy in H and d = rD(n) be the rank
of n in D, so that rD(n+ 1) = d+ 1. Then the incentives to deviate of the two candidates are
given by
δ(n) =
F (M − r,D r {n})
F (M − 1,D−(d− 1))ρn ,
and
δ(n+ 1) =
F (M − r,D r {n+ 1})
F (M − 1,D−(d))ρn+1 .
Therefore, with the help of Lemma 5,
δ(n+ 1)
δ(n)
=
ρn
(
X − Y ρn
)
ρn+1
(
X − Y ρn+1
) F (M − 1,D−(d− 1))
F (M − 1,D−(d)) ,
where
X = F (M − r,D r {n, n+ 1}) > 0,
and
Y = f(M − r,D r {n, n+ 1}) > 0.
The second fraction is clearly greater than 1 because F (P, .) is decreasing in its second argument
for the set order. As for the first fraction, notice that the function ρ(X − ρY ) is increasing in
ρ on (0, 1/2) whenever X/Y ≥ 1, and the latter is obviously satisfied. Since ρn > ρn+1, this
fraction is also greater than 1 when ρ1 ≤ 1/2. Therefore δ(n+ 1) > δ(n), which concludes the
proof for this case.
When M = 1, δ(n+ 1)/δ(n) is equal to ρn/(ρn+1(1− ρn)) > 1.
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Proposition 15. If M = 1 or ρ1 ≤ 1/2, [D,H] is a pure strategy equilibrium of the disclosure
game if and only if it satisfies
(i) H ⊆ NS.
(ii) H ≤M .
(iii) For any maximal chain J ⊆ DS,
F
(
M − 1,D−(rD(j(J))− 1))ρj(J) ≥ F(M − rH(j(J)),D r {j(J)}).
(iv) For any project h ∈ H,
F
(
M − 1,D−(rD(h)− 1))ρh ≤ F(M − rH(h),D).
Proof. The necessity is clear since (iii) and (iv) constitute a subset of the incentive conditions
that must hold in equilibrium. Sufficiency is a direct consequence of Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 5 (Full Disclosure – Characterization). By Proposition 15, the only
incentive condition that needs to be checked is that of NS, the weakest candidate in NS, which
is done in (4). When NW = ∅, the right-hand side of (4) becomes equal to 1, proving the second
statement. For the last point, remember that it is a dominant strategy for all the candidates
in NW to disclose their information. When (4) holds strictly, the proof is immediate if NS = 1,
while if NS > 1 it is strictly optimal for NS to disclose when all the candidates in N−(NS − 1)
disclose as well. If on the other hand M or more candidates in N−(NS−1) were to withhold, it
would clearly be strictly optimal for NS to disclose her information as she would stand no chance
of being rubberstamped otherwise. Finally, suppose that K < M candidates in N−(NS − 1)
withhold and denote by K ⊆ N−(NS − 1) this set of candidates, and J = N−(NS − 1)rK. In
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this case, NS strictly prefers to disclose if and only if
ρNS >
F (M −K − 1,N+(NS) ∪ J )
F (M − 1,J ) . (15)
Because F is decreasing in its second argument for the set order, F (M − 1,J ) > F (M −
1,N−(NS−1)). And by Lemma 6, F (M−K−1,N+(NS)∪J ) < F (M−1,N+(NS)∪J ∪K) =
F (M − 1,N r {NS}). Therefore, (4) implies (15), showing that it is a dominant strategy for
NS to disclose. Now consider candidate NS − 1. By Lemma 2, the equation obtained by
replacing NS by NS − 1 in (4) is satisfied. Hence repeating the argument implies that it is
also a dominant strategy for NS − 1 to disclose. By induction, this shows that the game is
dominance solvable.
Proof of Proposition 7 (Single Slot – Characterization). The fact that the equilibrium
described in the proposition exists under the condition given is a direct consequence of Proposi-
tion 15. In fact there is an equilibrium such that n is the only candidate withholding information
if and only if ρn ≤ (1− ρn+1) . . . (1− ρN) and ρn−1 ≥ (1− ρn+1) . . . (1− ρN). The only point to
prove is therefore uniqueness. Let Fn = (1− ρn+1) . . . (1− ρN). {Fn} is an increasing sequence
whereas {ρn} is a decreasing sequence. Then, by definition of n∗, ρn ≤ Fn if and only if n ≥ n∗.
But since for there to be an equilibrium in which n is the only withholding candidate ρn−1 ≥ Fn
must also hold, n∗ is the only possibility. Indeed if n ≥ n∗, ρn−1 ≤ Fn−1 < Fn so that the second
condition for an equilibrium cannot hold.
Proof of Proposition 8 (Single Slot – Comparative Statics). Let N0 = NS ∪ NW0 and
N1 = NS ∪ NW1 be two sets of projects such that each of them leads to a pure strategy
equilibrium [D,H]γ of the corresponding disclosure games Γγ. The proposition says that, if
either NW0 < NW1 or NW0 ⊂ NW1, the decision maker prefers N1 to N0, that is V ([D,H]1, 1) >
V ([D,H]0, 1).
Because F (0, .) is decreasing in its second argument for the set order as well as for the
strength order, and for any N and any n ∈ NS it is true that NW ⊆ N+(n), and therefore for
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every n ∈ NS, F (0,N+1 (n)) < F (0,N+0 (n)). Hence if nγ is the unique candidate who withholds
information in the equilibrium of the game γ ∈ {0, 1}, it must be true that n1 ≥ n0 that is the
withholding candidate is a weaker candidate in game 1 than in game 0. Since all the candidates
in NWγ disclose their information in equilibrium, this implies that the decision maker prefers
Γ1 to Γ0.
Proof of Proposition 9 (Outstanding Candidates). First note that ρ+ > ρ so that rub-
berstamping project 1 beats learning about it. Since 1 is the best project, any alternative
policy of the decision maker that stands a chance of being optimal given that 1 is not pro-
viding information consists in learning about k projects and rubberstamping 1 only if this
search proves unfruitful. The payoff of such a policy is of the form V = P1 + P2 where
P1 = ρ
1G− c+ (1− ρ1)(ρ2G− c+ (1− ρ2)(ρ3G− c+ . . . )) where the sum stops at ρkG− c, and
P2 = (1− ρ1) . . . (1− ρk)(ρ1(G+L)−L), and where ρ1, . . . , ρk denote the ordered prospects of
the k projects investigated by the decision maker. A little bit of algebra shows that
∂V
∂ρi
= (1− ρ1) . . . (1− ρi−1)
(
c(1 + (1− ρi+1)
+ . . . (1− ρk−1)) + (1− ρi+1) . . . (1− ρk)(1− ρ1)(G+ L)
)
> 0.
Hence V is strictly increasing in each ρi, and V < (ρ1G− c)(1 + (1− ρ1) + · · ·+ (1− ρ1)k−1) +
(1− ρ1)k(ρ1(G+L)−L) = (ρ1G− c)(1− (1− ρ1)k)/ρ1 + (1− ρ1)k(ρ1(G+L)−L). The payoff
of rubberstamping 1 without going through the preliminary search is ρ1(G + L)− L, and it is
greater than the former expression if and only if (with some algebra)
ρ21 − ρ1 +
c
G+ L
> 0.
The greatest root of the second degree equation associated with the former is
ρ+ =
1
2
(
1 +
√
1− 4c
L+G
)
,
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where 4c/(L + G) < 1 is implied by (AL) . Therefore ρ1 > ρ
+ implies that rubberstamping
1 beats the alternative strategy. Because, by withholding, candidate 1 can force the decision
maker to rubberstamp her project irrespective of the behavior of other candidates, rubber-
stamping 1 has to be the outcome of the game.
Characterization of the Mixed Strategy Equilibrium in Example 2. In order to make
1 indifferent between disclosing and withholding, λ2 must satisfy (λ2(1−ρ2)+(1−λ2))f(0,NW ) =
ρ1 where the left-hand side is 1’s payoff when withholding and the right-hand side is her payoff
when she discloses. The same indifference condition for candidate 2 gives λ1(1 − ρ1)ρ2 + (1 −
λ1)ρ2 = λ1(1− ρ1)f(0,NW ).
Appendix C Incomplete Information
Proof of Proposition 10 (BNE Existence). Propositions 1 and 3 and Theorem 1 of Mil-
grom and Weber (1985) imply that when the set of distributional strategies is topologized by
weak convergence, the players’ strategy sets are compact, convex metric spaces and the pay-
off functions are continuous and linear in each single player’s strategy, then the best response
function φ : Σ → 2Σ that maps a strategy σ into the set of best responses of any player (the
game is symmetric) to σ is a Kakutani map (that is upper-semicontinuous, non-empty valued
and convex valued), where Σ is the set of distributional strategies of each player. Then the
Kakutani-Glicksberg-Fan fixed point theorem implies that there exists a symmetric equilibrium
of the disclosure game in distributional strategies .
Proof of Proposition 11 (Full Disclosure). First note that (10) is equivalent to
ρˆ
(
1− ∫ x
ρˆ
xdH(x)
1− ∫ x
x
xdH(x)
)N−1
≥ 1,
and the left-hand side is equal to the ratio V 1D(ρˆ)/V
1
H(ρˆ) of the payoffs of a player with type
ρˆ when all other players disclose with probability 1. Therefore, (10) implies that there is no
40
incentive of a player with type ρˆ to deviate from full disclosure. It is therefore clearly a necessary
condition for equilibrium.
To show that it is also sufficient, note that for a candidate with type ρ > ρˆ, when all the
other candidates disclose with probability 1,
V 1D(ρ)
V 1H(ρ)
= ρ
(
1− ∫ x
ρ
xdH(x)
1− ∫ x
x
xdH(x)
)N−1
> ρˆ
(
1− ∫ x
ρˆ
xdH(x)
1− ∫ x
x
xdH(x)
)N−1
≥ 1,
implying that there is no incentive to deviate from the full disclosure profile for such a candidate.
Since it is a dominant strategy for the types below ρˆ to disclose, this proves that (10) is also
a sufficient condition. In the absence of weak types, Nˆ is infinite and full disclosure cannot be
an equilibrium.
Now suppose that (10) holds with a strict inequality, and that there exists ρk ≥ ρˆ such that
all strategies prescribing to disclose with probability less than 1 for some ρ < ρk have been
eliminated and call Lk the set of remaining strategies. Because the function
ρ
(
1− ∫ x
ρ
xdH(x)
1− ∫ x
x
xdH(x)
)N−1
is increasing in ρ, it must be strictly greater than 1 when evaluated at ρk. Now given a strategy
profile λ ∈ Lk, the incentive to disclose for a type ρ > ρk is given by
V λD,n(ρ)
V λH,n(ρ)
= ρ
∏
m6=n
1− ∫ x
ρ
xλm(x)dH(x)∫ x
x
λm(x)(1− x)dH(x) +
∫ ρ
ρk
(1− λm(x)) dH(x)
= ρ
∏
m6=n
1− ∫ x
ρ
xλm(x)dH(x)∫ ρk
x
λm(x)(1− x)dH(x) +
∫ ρ
ρk
(1− λm(x)x) dH(x) +
∫ x
ρ
(1− x)λm(x)dH(x)
≥ ρ
(
1− ∫ x
ρ
xdH(x)
1− ∫ x
x
dH(x) +
∫ ρ
ρk
xdH(x)
)N−1
≡ L(ρk, ρ),
where the lower bound is attained on Lk by the strategy λ(x) = 1− 1x∈(ρk,ρ). L(., .) is clearly
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continuous and the limit of L(ρk, ρ) as ρ→ ρk is
ρk
(
1− ∫ x
ρk
xdH(x)
1− ∫ x
x
xdH(x)
)N−1
> 1.
By continuity, it must also be strictly greater than 1 on a neighborhood to the right of ρk. Thus
we can define
ρk+1 = sup {ρ ∈ (ρk, x) : L(ρk, ρ) > 1} .
If ρk+1 < x, it must be true that L(ρk, ρk+1) = 1. We can define Lk+1 to be the set of strategies
that prescribe to disclose with probability 1 whenever ρ < ρk+1. The construction of ρk+1
implies that, provided that players are restricted to use strategies in Lk, strategies in LkrLk+1
are strictly dominated.
Let ρ0 = ρˆ and define L0 accordingly. I have already proved in Lemma 3 that strategies
that are not in L0 are strictly dominated. Therefore I can apply the construction above to
find an increasing sequence {ρ0, ρ1, . . . } and the corresponding shrinking sequence {L0,L1, . . . }
stopping whenever ρk = x. If this happens, the construction implies that the only strategy that
survives the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is to disclose with probability
1 everywhere except perhaps at ρ = x.
Suppose that it is not the case so that for every k, ρk < x. Because the sequence (ρk)k≥0
is increasing and bounded, it admits a limit ρ∞ ≤ x. By construction, the relationship
L(ρk, ρk+1) = 1 must hold for every k. Then, taking k to infinity and using the continuity
of L(., .)
L(ρ∞, ρ∞) = ρ∞
(
1− ∫ x
ρ∞ xdH(x)
1− ∫ x
x
dH(x)
)N−1
= 1.
But the function
ρ
(
1− ∫ x
ρ
xdH(x)
1− ∫ x
x
xdH(x)
)N−1
is increasing in ρ and strictly greater than 1 at ρˆ and therefore also at ρ∞ > ρˆ. A contradiction.
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Therefore all strategies that disclose with probability less than 1 anywhere except at ρ = x
are eliminated in a finite number of steps. But then the incentive to disclose for type x is given
by
x
(
1
1− ∫ x
x
xdH(x)
)N−1
≥ ρˆ
(
1− ∫ x
ρˆ
xdH(x)
1− ∫ x
x
xdH(x)
)N−1
> 1.
Hence strategies that prescribe to disclose with probability less than 1 for x can be eliminated
as well.
Proof of Proposition 12 (Comparative Statics). To show that NˆG ≤ NˆH , note that I
can rewrite
NˆH = 1 +
log(1/ρˆ)
− logRH ,
where
RH =
1− ∫ x
x
xdH(x)
1− ∫ x
ρˆ
xdH(x)
= 1−
∫ ρˆ
x
xdH(x)
1− ∫ x
ρˆ
xdH(x)
,
and NˆH is increasing in RH . Integrating by parts, I obtain
RH = 1 +
∫ ρˆ
x
H(x)dx− ρˆH(ρˆ)
1− x+ ρˆH(ρˆ) + ∫ x
ρˆ
H(x)dx
.
And clearly, RG ≤ RH since G(x) ≤ H(x) on [x, ρˆ] and G(x) ≥ H(x) on [ρˆ, x]. Hence
NˆG ≤ NˆH .
Proof of Lemma 4. Let Ω ⊆ (ρˆ, x) be an open interval such that λ = 1 on Ω and x ∈ Ω. Let
y = sup{ρ : ∀ρ′ ∈ [x, ρ], λ(ρ′) = 1}. Suppose y < x. By continuity of the payoff functions, it
must be true that V λD(y) = V
λ
H(y). However, V
λ
D(.) is strictly increasing on (x, y) while V
λ
H(.) is
constant on the same interval. Furthermore, since λ is an equilibrium strategy, V λD(x) > V
λ
H(x),
but then by continuity V λD(y) > V
λ
D(x) > V
λ
H(x) = V
λ
H(y), a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 13 (Equilibrium Characterization). The only claim that needs to
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be proved is the last point of the proposition. By Proposition 11, full disclosure is not an
equilibrium. No disclosure cannot be an equilibrium either as then V 0D(x) = x > 0 = V
0
H(x). By
Lemma 4, a pure strategy equilibrium must be of the type λ(ρ) = 1ρ>ρ∗ for some ρ
∗ ∈ (x, x).
But then, V λD(ρ
∗) = ρ∗
(
1− ∫ x
ρ∗ xdH(x)
)N−1
<
(
1− ∫ x
ρ∗ xdH(x)
)N−1
= V λH(ρ
∗) which is a
contradiction since by continuity the type ρ∗ should be indifferent between the two actions.
Proof of Proposition 14 (Competition at the Limit). I start by proving a few useful
lemmas.
Lemma 7. Suppose weak types are absent. There exists some N0 such that for N > N0, if
the strategy λ defines a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the disclosure game such that
there exists ρ ∈ Int(Λ0), then [ρ, x] ⊆ Λ0.
Proof. There must be some η > 0 such that Ω = [ρ, ρ + η) ⊆ Λ0. I can differentiate V λD(.) and
V λH(.) on Ω to obtain
(
V λD
)′
(ρ) =
(
1−
∫ x
ρ
xλ(x)dH(x)
)N−1
=
V λD(ρ)
ρ
<
V λH(ρ)
x
,
where the inequality is due to the fact that ρ ∈ Λ0 and that λ is an equilibrium. Also,
(
V λH
)′
(ρ) = (N − 1)h(ρ)
(∫ ρ
x
(1− xλ(x))dH(x) +
∫ x
ρ
λ(x)(1− x)dH(x)
)N−2
= (N − 1)h(ρ)V λH(ρ)1−
1
N−1
≥ (N − 1)mV λH(ρ),
where m is the lower bound of h and the last inequality obtains because VH is always bounded
above by 1.
It is clear then that for N > 1 + 1
xm
, V λH(.) grows faster than V
λ
D(.) on Ω. But since
V λH(ρ) > V
λ
D(ρ), it means that V
λ
H must remain above V
λ
D on Ω so that the payoff from disclosing
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can never catch up with the payoff from withholding. This implies that no type above ρ would
want to disclose with positive probability, hence [ρ, x] ⊆ Λ0.
Lemma 8. For every ε > 0, there exists some N1 such that if λ defines a symmetric Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of the disclosure game for some N > N1 such that Int(Λ) 6= ∅, then for every
ρ ∈ Int(Λ), ∣∣∣∣λ(ρ)− 11 + ρ
∣∣∣∣ < ε.
Proof. For every ρ ∈ Int(Λ), V λH(ρ) = V λD(ρ). Since the two functions are differentiable on
Int(Λ), their derivatives must be equal as well, implying
(N − 1)(1− λ(ρ))h(ρ)V λH(ρ)1−
1
N−1 =
V λD(ρ)
ρ
+ ρ2(N − 1)λ(ρ)h(ρ)
(
V λD(ρ)
ρ
)1− 1
N−1
.
Noting that V λH(ρ) = V
λ
D(ρ), and after some algebra, I obtain
1
1 + ρ
− λ(ρ) = V
λ
D(ρ)
1
N−1
(N − 1)ρ(1 + ρ)h(ρ) +
ρλ(ρ)
1 + ρ
(
ρ
1
N−1 − 1
)
.
Hence ∣∣∣∣ 11 + ρ − λ(ρ)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1(N − 1)x(1 + x)m + x1 + x (1− x 1N−1) .
Since both terms on the right-hand side go to 0 and are independent of ρ, this proves the
lemma.
Lemma 9. There exists some ` > 0 and some N2 such that if λ defines a symmetric Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of the disclosure game for some N > N2 such that Int(Λ) 6= ∅, then for every
ρ ∈ Int(Λ),
1− ` > λ(ρ) > `.
Proof. This is a corollary of Lemma 8 obtained by choosing ` = ε = min
(
1
2(1+x)
, 1
2
(
1− 1
1+x
))
.
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By Lemma 4 and Lemma 7, there are five possible types of symmetric Bayesian Nash
equilibria when N is sufficiently high: (i) λ = 1; (ii) λ = 0; (iii) Λ = [x, y) and Λ1 = (y, x]
for some y ∈ (x, x); (iv) Λ = [x, y) and Λ0 = (y, x] for some y ∈ (x, x); (v) Λ = [x, x]. By
Proposition 13, (i) and (ii) are impossible.
Suppose that there exists a sequence (λk)
∞
k=1 of equilibria of type (iv) for the disclosure
game with N(k) candidates, where N(k) increases strictly with k. To each λk is associated a
yk ∈ (x, x) and since [x, x] is compact, I can assume, up to an extraction, that the sequence
yN(k) converges to some y∞ ∈ [x, x]. Because it is an equilibrium to withhold with the type x,
I can write
V kD(x) = x <
(
1−
∫ x
x
xλk(x)dH(x)
)N(k)−1
= V kH(x).
Using Lemma 9, for a sufficiently high k
(
1−
∫ x
x
xλk(x)dH(x)
)N(k)−1
≤ (1− `xH(yk))N(k)−1,
and for the right-hand side to be greater than x for every k it must be true that y∞ = x. But
then, looking at the incentives of type yk, we have
V kD(yk) = yk −−−→
k→∞
x,
and
V kH(yk) =
(∫ yk
x
(1− xλ(x))dH(x)
)N(k)−1
≤ ((1− `x)H(yk))N(k)−1 −−−→
k→∞
0,
implying that for k sufficiently high V kD(yk) > V
k
H(yk) which is a contradiction since these payoffs
should be equal for λk to be an equilibrium.
Suppose now that there exists a similar sequence (λk)
∞
k=1 of equilibria of type (v). Then for
k sufficiently high,
V kH(x) =
(
1−
∫ x
x
xλk(x)dH(x)
)N(k)−1
< (1− `x)N(k)−1 −−−→
k→∞
0.
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Hence for k sufficiently high V kH(x) < x = V
k
D(x), which contradicts the fact that λk is an
equilibrium.
Hence, for N sufficiently large, the only possible equilibria are of type (iii). They exist by
Proposition 10. Let (λk)
∞
k=1 be a sequence of equilibria of this type. The payoffs of type yk are
given by
V kD(yk) = yk
(
1−
∫ x
yk
xdH(x)
)N(k)−1
,
and
V kH(yk) =
(
1−
∫ x
yk
xdH(x)−
∫ yk
x
xλk(x)dH(x)
)N(k)−1
,
and are equal since λk is an equilibrium. Hence, for every k > 0,
(
1− y
1
N(k)−1
k
)(
1−
∫ x
yk
xdH(x)
)
=
∫ yk
x
xλk(x)dH(x).
Since
(
1− ∫ x
yk
xdH(x)
)
is bounded and 0 < x < yk < x < 1, the left-hand side goes to 0
as k → ∞. Because the right-hand side is bounded below by `xH(yk), it must be true that
y∞ = x. The remaining of the proposition is a consequence of Lemma 8.
Proposition 16 (Multiple Slots). With multiple slots, any symmetric pure strategy equilibrium
must take the form
λ(ρ) = 1ρ∈Λ1 ,
where
Λ1 = [x, ρˆ) ∪ 〈ρ∗, x]
for some ρ∗ ≥ ρˆ, and where 〈 denotes either ( or [. In the absence of weak types, there is no pure
strategy equilibrium. In particular, full disclosure is impossible in the absence of weak types.
Proof. The arguments used to prove this proposition extend those of the single slot case. I only
describe the main intuitions.
For any Borel set K ⊆ S, let η (K) = ∫K dH(x) be the measure of this set according to the
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measure implied by the distribution H, and let xe(K) = 1
η
(
K
) ∫K xdH(x) denote the expected
type of a candidate knowing that her type lies in K. When M ≥ 1 and all the candidates except
i play according to the pure strategy: disclose on Λ1, withhold on Λ0 = SrΛ1, the payoff from
disclosing for candidate n as a function of her type ρ is given by
VD(ρ) = ρ · Pr
(
there are less than M − 1 good projects in Λ1 ∩ (ρ, x)
)
= ρ ·
{
N−1∑
m=0
(
m
N − 1
)
η
(
Λ1 ∩ (ρ, x))m(1− η(Λ1 ∩ (ρ, x)))N−1−m
×
min(m,M−1)∑
k=0
(
k
m
)
xe
(
Λ1 ∩ (ρ, x))k(1− xe(Λ1 ∩ (ρ, x)))m−k}, (16)
and the payoff from withholding
VH(ρ) = 1ρ>ρˆ Pr
(
the number of good projects in Λ1+ the number of projects in Λ0 ∩ (ρ, x) ≤M − 1
)
= 1ρ>ρˆ
N−1∑
m=0
(
m
N − 1
)
η
(
Λ1
)m(
1− η(Λ1))N−1−m
×
min(m,M−1)∑
k=0
(
k
m
)
xe
(
Λ1
)k(
1− xe
(
Λ1
))m−k
×
M−1−k∑
l=0
(
l
N − 1−m
)(
η
(
Λ0 ∩ (ρ, x))
η
(
Λ0
) )l(η(Λ0)− η(Λ0 ∩ (ρ, x))
η
(
Λ0
) )N−1−m−l .
(17)
The intuition works in the same way as in the case with M = 1. VD is strictly increasing in
ρ everywhere (because the set Λ1 ∩ (ρ, x) is shrinking as ρ increases implying that if there are
less than M − 1 good projects in that set for a certain ρ then there are also less than M − 1
good projects in that set for a higher ρ), whereas VH is constant in ρ on Λ
1 and increasing
elsewhere. Both functions are continuous on (ρˆ, x). Therefore Λ1 = [x, ρˆ) ∪ 〈ρ∗, x] for some
ρ∗ ∈ [ρˆ, x]. The threshold ρ∗ is now characterized by the following equation which says that
VD(ρ
∗) = VH(ρ∗) and makes use of the particular form of Λ1.
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ρ∗
{
N−1∑
m=0
(
m
N − 1
)(
1−H(ρ∗)
)m
H(ρ∗)N−1−m
×
min(m,M−1)∑
k=0
(
k
m
)(
1
1−H(ρ∗)
∫ x
ρ∗
xdH(x)
)k (
1− 1
1−H(ρ∗)
∫ x
ρ∗
xdH(x)
)m−k}
=
N−1∑
m=0
(
m
N − 1
)(
1−H(ρ∗) +H(ρˆ)
)m(
H(ρ∗)−H(ρˆ)
)N−1−m
×
min(m,M−1)∑
k=0
(
k
m
)(
1
1−H(ρ∗) +H(ρˆ)
∫
(x,ρˆ)∪(ρ∗,x)
xdH(x)
)k
×
(
1− 1
1−H(ρ∗) +H(ρˆ)
∫
(x,ρˆ)∪(ρ∗,x)
xdH(x)
)m−k
. (18)
(18) simply states that the frontier type ρ∗ must be indifferent between disclosing (on the
left-hand side) and withholding (on the right-hand side). If for ρ∗ = ρˆ, the left-hand side is
greater than the right-hand side, then full disclosure is an equilibrium. If for ρ∗ = x, the
left-hand side is smaller than the right-hand side, then no disclosure is an equilibrium. If the
left-hand side is strictly greater than the right-side for every ρ∗ ∈ (ρˆ, x), full disclosure is the
unique symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies, and if the opposite inequality holds on (ρˆ, x),
no disclosure is the unique equilibrium. In the absence of weak candidates H(ρˆ) = 0 and the
left-hand side of (18) is then equal to its right-hand side multiplied by ρ∗ < 1. Therefore, in
the absence of weak types, no disclosure is the only possible symmetric equilibrium in pure
strategies. However it is clear that no disclosure cannot be an equilibrium as the lowest type
would be better off by disclosing, and therefore there is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium
in the absence of weak types.
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